Reseña del libro "The Logical Structure of Language (en Inglés)"
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at leastserves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merelyphilosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politicsetc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgensteinand others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 andunconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent studentsof behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structureof intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein'sfundamental discovery -that all truly 'philosophical' problems are the same-confusionsabout how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same-lookingat how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditionsof Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but onecannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in avery specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the modernperspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as 'thinking fast, thinking slow'), employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show thatthis is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior.
